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e Natural Ontological Attitude in a
Hermeneutic Context
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My aim in this paper is to re-examine Arthur Fine’s concept of the natural ontolog-
ical attitude. Whereas earlier critical interpretations focus on the compatibility of
NOAwith scientic realism, I argue that Fine’s conception is to be recast in terms of
an interpretative theory of scientic research. Specically, I make the case that the
hermeneutic reformulation of NOA is unavoidable when at stake are the issues of
the structural, conceptual, and experimental articulation of scientic domain.e
paper concludes by considering the formation of local epistemological positions in
the research process.
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1. Introduction
Arthur Fine argues that there is an anthropologically quasi-universal atti-
tude that is formed and developed in a natural manner. Fine is less preoc-
cupied with the question of whether the predicate ‘natural’ in the NOA is to
be tied to a kind of evolutionary and/or cognitive naturalism than with the
methodological functions this attitude serves in scientic research. Since
Fine does not oer a naturalist framework that circumscribes the method-
ological line of reasoning, his conception of NOA is distinguished by a kind
of methodological anti-naturalism. In commenting on the status of the nat-
ural ontological attitude, Fine places emphasis entirely on the primary on-
tic assumptions and intuitions of “more homely truths” that play crucial
role in getting scientic knowledge. ese assumptions and intuitions are
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“methodologically natural” as comparedwith the “non-natural”methodolo-
gies imposed externally through epistemological interpretations of scientic
research.e natural ontological attitude counsels the participants in scien-
tic research to accept the results of their practices as true. More specically,
NOA commits the scientists to the world as it gets articulated in scientic
research qua a mode of being in the world. us considered, the concep-
tion of NOA can be tied to various philosophical traditions. Fine strongly
rejects any connection with the (prima facie closest to his views) tradition
of phenomenological investigation of the pre-predicative natürliche Einstel-
lung.e insistence on transcendental subjectivity seems to be at odds with
his radical anti-essentialism. However, Fine’s scenario of howNOA operates
in scientic research cannot avoid appealing to transcendental arguments.
It is the implementation of such arguments without admitting an au-
tonomous transcendental position that makes the conception of NOA akin
to the tradition of pragmatism, especially to Peirce’s philosophy. Moreover,
NOA is not a passive (contemplative) but rather a practical-instrumental
attitude. By implication, pragmatism/pragmaticism seems to be a “natu-
ral ally” of the NOA conception. In fact, the unique combination of the
concept of ‘true community of researchers’, the logic of abduction, and the
specic brand of realism in Peirce’s philosophy implies a constellation of as-
sumptions similar to NOA. Interestingly enough, Peirce ascribes these as-
sumptions not to the particular participants in scientic research but to the
“community that is ordered by discovery” and freed from ideological inter-
ests. e trans-subjective self-control of the inquiry into truth is what vin-
dicates Peirce’s pragmaticism. e analogy with Peircean pragmatism can
help one to pay closer attention to the trans-subjective character of NOA.
Yet pragmatism, I believe, is not the philosophy which can provide the re-
sources for scrutinizing this character. In Peirce’s doctrine of how individ-
ual inquirers are incorporated into the scientic community, the priority of
the trans-subjectivity follows simply from the ideal-regulative status of this
community. (It is another question that Peirce in his political philosophy
and doctrine of positive freedom champions the transformation of the ideal
into real community.1) Appealing to an ideal (quasi-transcendental) com-
munity would restore again that spirit of essentialism which Fine repudiates
with quite good arguments. To sum up, a “more philosophical” reading of
NOAwould be only justied if the trans-subjectivity of this attitude gets ad-
vocated from a radically non-essentialist viewpoint. From such a viewpoint,
one ought to address the NOA’s self-suciency which makes any external
epistemological interpretation of scientic research superuous.
My aim in this paper is to broaden Fine’s conception of the natural onto-
1 See on this point (Ward 2001).
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logical attitude by reformulating its central claims in terms of a view about
the interpretative fore-structuring of scientic research. I am going to criti-
cize some deciencies of NOA’s original formulation by appealing to a her-
meneutic theory thatwill be unfolded step by step in the discussion to follow.
Fine focuses on the issue of howNOA enables scientists’ interpretative prac-
tices. Nonetheless, he is convinced that science’s interpretative dimension
is not in need of a hermeneutic elucidation. More specically, Fine makes
the case that the philosophically minimal characterization of NOA’s inter-
pretative character is to dispense with an interpretative-reective strategy
about the specicity of science en bloc. He (1996, 148) goes on to argue that
a “hermeneutic understanding of science has to be gained from the inside.
It should not be prefabricated to meet external, philosophical specications.
ere is, then, no legitimate hermeneutical account of science, but only a
hermeneutical activity that is a lively part of science itself.”
To be sure, this statement is in full agreement with Fine’s anti-essential-
ism which will be commented on later. Yet in attributing an externalist
schematism to the hermeneutic enterprise, Fine seems to misunderstand
the very idea of a hermeneutics of scientic research. Like the conception of
NOA, the latter has no prior extra-scientic commitments. Roughly speak-
ing, an interpretative theory of science’s practices of reading experiments,
experimental systems, instruments, measurements, theoretical concepts,
models, diagrams, dierential equations, etc. is predicated on a double her-
meneutics that avoids any superimposition of interpretative or explanatory
schemes on science.e scenarios of studying science in the perspective of
double hermeneutics aim at an interpretative understanding of the ways in
which contextualmeaning of scientic objects becomes interpretatively con-
stituted.2 ese scenarios oppose the ideas of social or rhetorical construc-
tion of scientic knowledge’s objectivity.emain point of the interpretative
theory of science is that the process of reading in scientic research consti-
tutes meaningful scientic objects, thereby articulating the domains of re-
search. Like the conception of NOA, the hermeneutics of scientic research
is thoroughly deationist. Both of them opt for deationism over a priori
explanations of scientic rationality. In both cases, one is engaged in un-
dercutting the ideas that science has a metaphysical essence and an ultimate
goal. (However, the hermeneutics of scientic research argues in addition
that despite the lack of an essence and a goal science manages to create its
cognitive specicity within its interpretative spaces of representation. e
topic of this specicity is not at stake in the conception of NOA.)
us, Fine’s charge can be resisted. In what follows I will be concerned
2 On various aspects of this double hermeneutics as applied to science’s understanding see,
(Kockelmans 1993), (Eger 2006), (Ginev 1997).
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with showing that Fine’s reasons for adopting NOA coincide essentially with
the reasons for introducing a hermeneutic theory of scientic research that
does not violate the rule to gain a philosophical understanding from the in-
side.3 My contention is that there is a rationale for a hermeneutic rereading
of NOA. On the account I am going to suggest, the core of the natural onto-
logical attitude consists of an initial (i.e. pre-epistemological) interpretation
of the world that operates also within science’s interpretative practices and
their spaces of representation.
Assigning a pre-epistemological character to the “core position” inval-
idates the critical argument that there is a lack of resources in Fine’s con-
ception to demonstrate the independence of the natural ontological attitude
from the tenets of scientic realism. Unless one attributes to NOA mini-
mal commonsensical (i.e. rudimentary realist) epistemological assumptions,
NOA is not a proto-realist position. Moreover, the conception under discus-
sion would fail to avoid a self-defeating character, if one goes on to attribute
a primitive realism to NOA. In this case, the conception would have had to
aver two claims that contradict each other: (a) NOA is simply an explication
of a realist position that is naturally formed and developed; and (b) NOA
opposes each kind of realism since every realist position stems from an im-
position of external philosophical interpretations on the naturally developed
ontological assumptions.
On a further claim that will be scrutinized in the remainder, NOA gets
circumscribed by contextually employed “readable technologies” of scien-
tic research, whereby it retains its pre-epistemological status in the research
process. Yet the role of the natural ontological attitude is by no means to
be restricted to transference of what intuitively is “more homely true” from
everyday experience to science. From a hermeneutic point of view, in sci-
entic research NOA plays a much more active role by fore-structuring the
formation of local epistemological positions and the articulation of scien-
tic domains. e formation of such positions is entangled in the struc-
tural, conceptual, and experimental articulation of scientic domains. On
a main hermeneutic tenet, the articulation of a scientic domain oscillates
between the de- and re-contextualization of objects of inquiry.e balance
between them (established as a tendency of articulation) denes a charac-
teristic hermeneutic situation of scientic research. In science the natural
ontological attitude is always circumscribed by such a situation.
e rst step in working out this thesis requires to introducing the con-
cepts of a hermeneutic fore-structure and a characteristic hermeneutic sit-
uation of scientic domain’s articulation. I will address this task in two sec-
tions to come. is job accomplished, I will turn in the nal section to the
3 On Fine’s reasons for adopting NOA see also (Rouse 1988).
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hermeneutic reformulation ofNOA. It ismy contention that such a reformu-
lation opens the avenue for an interesting dialogue between the analytical
and the Continental philosophy of science. Finally, the issue of the double
status of NOA in the hermeneutics of scientic practices will be briey ad-
dressed.
2. PreliminaryHermeneuticConsiderations: Scientic Practices
and Possibilities of Research
On the so-called semantic view, theories are collections of models (mathe-
matical structures of one or another sort). A radical version of this view pos-
tulates that theories’ structures are described only up to isomorphism. e
determinism about theories’ semantic interpretation implied by this version
has several unwelcome epistemological consequences. For instance, it pre-
vents one from taking into account non-structural factors in the interpreta-
tion of scientic theories. To avoid such consequences requires a weaken-
ing of semantic structuralism. ere are a growing number of proposals in
this regard.4 In my view, however, the philosophically most interesting way
to accomplish this job was suggested by Bas van Fraassen many years ago.
In Scientic Image he addresses the task of weakening semantic structural-
ism by making room for a hermeneutic openness in theory construction.
He (1980, 55–58) devises a hermeneutic circle that takes place in the mathe-
matical saving of phenomena. Notoriously, van Fraassen claims that experi-
mentation (as a selective construction of data models) is the continuation of
theory construction by other means. In this continuation a specic kind of
interplay between theory’s interpretation and the construction of relational
structures of data (appearances) takes place.is interplay aims at establish-
ing a balance between the range of theory’s semantic models (which should
be suciently wide to delineate the empirical area of theory’s validity) and
the narrowing down of this range so as to give the theory greater empirical
content. It is this interplay that gets addressed in terms of a hermeneutic
circularity.
ree steps are to be distinguished in van Fraassen’s way of specifying
science’s intra-theoretical hermeneutic circle. He admits that it would be
strange if scientic theories described the phenomena in dierent terms
from the trans-phenomenal rest of the world they describe. By implication,
he asserts that it is impossible to interpret science by dividing its language
into observable and non-observable parts since they are involved in a co-
4 A case in point is the search for semantic models that contain modal information. Kather-
ine Brading (2011, 58–59) calls themodelswhich contains a range of possible trajectories for
the system, specifying what the system can and must do according to the theory, “generic
models”.
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interpretative relationship.is is the argument of constructive empiricism
for making use of the gure of hermeneutic circle in revealing science’s lin-
guistic homogeneity.inking in terms of an interpretative circularity puts
forward an alternative to drawing an essential (philosophically signicant)
line between the phenomenal and the trans-phenomenal bymeans of an ob-
servable/unobservable distinction of science vocabulary.5 A leading role in
handling circularity of saving phenomena plays the kind of holism champi-
oned by constructive empiricism:e phenomena are saved when they are
exhibited as fragments of a larger unity that does not have a surplus ofmean-
ing beyond the meaning of phenomena. Accordingly, the hermeneutic cir-
cle is dened as an inter-translatability of particular descriptive statements
and the theory’s semantic model(s) in which the validity of these statements
become authenticated. In other words, this is the inter-translatability which
underlies the semantically justied empirical adequacy of a scientic theory.
e hermeneutic circle in question is an intra-theoretical one because
it is the theory that draws the demarcation between the phenomenal and
the trans-phenomenal.e demarcation is not drawn by means of an exter-
nal philosophical conception as this is the case of the vocabulary distinction
(put forward, in particular, by Carnap). rough its semantic models the
theory discloses certain areas as observable.e next step van Fraassen un-
dertakes is to gure out how to avoid a collapse of this hermeneutic circle
into a vicious circularity. For this purpose, he makes the case that the inter-
translatability opposes the post-empiricist thesis of the theory-dependence
of observation in a radical manner.e following passage is quite illumina-
tive in that regard:
To delineate what is observable (within a theory) wemust look to that
same theory for that is also an empirical question.ismight produce
a vicious circle if what is observable were itself not simply disclosed by
theory, but rather theory-relative or theory-dependent. It will already
be quite clear that I deny this: I regard what is observable as a theory-
independent question. (van Fraassen 1980, 57)
Since observation is a special subspecies of measurement, the doctrine
of the intra-theoretical hermeneutic circle should be integrated in the gen-
eral theory of measurement. is is the nal step in van Fraassen’s discus-
sion. Only measurable phenomena are meaningful in scientic research.
e circle is between the theoretical context in which one identies what
counts as a measurement of a certain property and the disclosing of mea-
surable phenomenon in that context. Granted that an acceptable theory has
at least one model that all measurable phenomena t inside, the context is
5 See (van Fraassen 1976).
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provided by theory’s models.e theoretical context of measurement is not
behind the measurable phenomena. As a disclosing whole, it has no mean-
ing beyond the interplay of theory’s interpretation and the construction of
relational structures of phenomena.
Short aer van Fraassen developed his view about the hermeneutic cir-
cle in theory construction Patrick Heelan (1983) advancedmuch broader in-
terpretative doctrine of scientic research.6 His point of departure was the
claim that the semantic interpretation of theory’s mathematical structure is
not only complemented by various kinds of non-structural interpretation
but it is involved in an open hermeneutic circularity that transcends from
the very outset theory construction. On this account, theory construction
is a particular (cluster of) practice(s) that does not enjoy a privileged status
among the totality of practices. us, he went on to transform the intra-
theoretical circle into an interpretative circularity that embraces all practices
of scientic research. Heelan defended this transformation by treating each
of these practices as a readable technology.7 Scientic research is a process
of employing readable technologies that create particular spaces of repre-
sentation in which the objects of inquiry take place. In Heelan’s perspective,
interpretative practices (i.e. practices qua readable technologies) of scientic
research get distinguished by a potentiality to constitute relevant objects of
inquiry.8
Following this thread, one is to state that a hermeneutic doctrine of sci-
entic research is entitled to portray the process of research in terms of
changing congurations of interrelated practices.9 Scientic research is pred-
icated on a dynamics of reticulated routine practices of constructing and
calibrating instruments, designing and replicating experiments, preparing
reports on observations, applying formal techniques for a graphical descrip-
tion, developing systems of dierential equations, controlling experimental
systems, measuring control parameters of experimental systems, construct-
ing various kinds of models, devising thought experiments, representing
systems’ dynamics through phase diagrams, creating computer simulations,
and so on. Each particular conguration denes a situation in the devel-
opment of this process. In operating as a readable technology a scientic
6 In the 1980’s Patrick Heelan championed the idea that hermeneutics is to be applied not
(only) to studying the argumentative structure of scientic publication (i.e. as a counter-
part to the rhetoric of science) but most of all to studying the production of theoretical
and empirical results (science’s cognitive content) within practices of “normal-scientic
life-worlds”. See, for instance, (Heelan 1989).
7 See (Heelan 1983, 181–204).
8 On Heelan’s most elaborated version of scientic research’s hermeneutic circularity see
(Heelan 1998).
9 On a detailed discussion of this theory see (Ginev 2011).
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practice opens a space of representation of what gets read. Since the prac-
tices involved in a conguration work in concert, there is no space of rep-
resentation existing independent of the situation’s other spaces.10 One is to
state that in a situation of scientic research, because of practices’ reticulated
interrelatedness, the reading process takes place in deferring spaces of rep-
resentation. e meaning of what is represented and read in a given space
is always already deferred in the spaces of other practices with which the
current readable practice is interrelated. As a consequence, the objects of
inquiry are scattered in these spaces. Yet the scattering occurs in a projected
horizon of possibilities for articulation of a research domain. What is read
and represented in deferring spaces of representation is fore-structured by
the projection of a horizon of possibilities. Due to the fore-structuring of do-
main’s articulation, the formal, the theoretical, and the empirical objects of
inquiry are potentially homogeneous entities, despite their dissemination in
spaces of reading/representation. Before spelling out this view, let me briey
address the concept of domain’s articulation.
e articulation has threemain dimensions which should be dubbed (a)
the structural, (b) the conceptual, and (c) the experimental articulation. Do-
main’s structural articulation is the process of interpreting the mathematical
structure of domain’s theory by means of semantic models.e conceptual
dimension refers to the articulation of data-models for domain’s theoretical
concepts. Finally, by experimental articulation I mean the experimentally
veried theoretical predictions. is dimension of domain’s articulation is
a function of the ongoing independent testing of domain’s theory.e out-
come of the experimental articulation is the growing number of empirical
states of aairs identied bymeans of domain’s theory (or, more precisely, by
means of experiments gured out and licensed by that theory). To be sure,
the three modes of articulation are only analytically separable. In fact, they
are working in concert, and each well-substantiated reconstructive model of
science has to reveal their forms of interdependence.
ad (a) In opposing scientic realism, the contemporary structuralist ten-
dency in philosophy of science promotes a shi away from objects to the
structures.11 Yet leading champions of this tendency still insist that the for-
mer are not “dissolved” but rather “embedded” in the latter. With regard
to this embeddedness, it seems to me appropriate to say that the structural
articulation of a domain brings into being a range of meaningful (mathe-
matical, hypothetical-theoretical, and empirically veried) entities that ex-
ist within the situation’s contextualized spaces of representation. Per deni-
tionem, a space of representation is a space inwhich the structure and objects
10 See (Rheinberger 1997, 91–95).
11 See, for instance, (French and Ladyman 2011).
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are united. Examples of such spaces which represent “structures with em-
bedded objects” are a phase diagram, a statistical ensemble of experimental
results, network of quantiable data achieved by calibrated instruments, an
algebraic model of measurements, a particular solution of a system of dif-
ferential equations, or a semantic model of a theory’s formalism. To make
use of Nelson Goodman’s celebrated distinction, in all of these cases one has
in mind ‘representation as’ and not ‘representation of ’. In scientic research,
representing something as a data-model, a computer simulation, a phase di-
agram, and so on, amounts to reading it within the respective spaces of rep-
resentation. In representing meaningful entities, one constantly reads them
within the horizon projected by the situation’s conguration of practices.
ad (b) Each theoretical concept is “inscribed” on a horizon of possible
data-models that can take place in various situations of the research pro-
cess.e theoretical concepts are always represented by data-models. (ere
is a belief in the existence of a trans-phenomenal entity involved in such
a concept. us, at the end of 1920s the dominant research community
in quantum mechanics believes that the domain’s theoretical concepts re-
fer to objects whose physical observables can be expressed by self-adjoint
operators. ough nobody at that time was able to demonstrate the phys-
ical signicance of these operators, the belief in quantum-mechanical ob-
jects expressible via the theory of group representation by linear transfor-
mations remained intact. It was this belief that guided the search for data-
models of the theoretical concepts.) e ongoing instantiation of a theo-
retical concept by data in the research process transforms progressively a
trans-phenomenal entity into a manifold of data-models. Yet this trans-
formation is an innite process since the content of a theoretical concept
cannot be represented by a nite set of data-models. By implication, these
concepts possess a twofold existence—as “inscriptions” on projected hori-
zons related to “beliefs in trans-phenomenal entities being instantiated by
empirical models” and as a growing instantiation of the objects (which the
theoretical concepts refer to) by means of data-models.e content of these
concepts do not exist beyond (or independently of) the circularity of pro-
jected horizon and actual instantiations.12 is view does not depend on
the ontological assumptions about the theoretical terms’ content. One may
assume that what the theoretical concepts express are structures all the way
dawn. Or alternatively, onemay subscribe to a kind of “reist ontology” (aer
the doctrine of “reism” which claims that the category of object is the only
ontological category), thereby arguing that all structures are reducible to in-
trinsic properties of objects. Of course, there is a wide spectrum of interme-
diate kinds of ontology. Regardless of the ontology, however, one assumes
12 See (Ginev 2008).
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that the theoretical concepts have meaning only within the aforementioned
interpretative circularity. e metaphysical attitudes brought into play by
all of these sorts of ontological assumptions are irrelevant to the conceptual
articulation of a scientic domain.
ad (c)e experimental articulation of a domain is also involved in a
sui generis hermeneutic circularity. It is projected upon a horizon of theo-
retical predictions whose gradual experimental testing extends or narrows
down the very horizon. e experimental outcomes articulate the domain
within a projected horizon of possible (empirically veriable) states of aairs
(theoretical predictions).us, the independent testing of theoretical predi-
cations sets up own interplay of projection and appropriation of possibilities
of domain’s articulation.
e three dimensions of domain’s articulation premise an “original” ar-
ticulation of the world achieved by the natural ontological attitude in accor-
dancewith (what Fine calls) “homely truths”. Yet both types of articulation—
the pre-scientic and the three-dimensional scientic one—run as interpre-
tative processes within horizons of understanding the world qua projected
possibilities. ere is no primary attitude toward the “external world” hid-
den behind the interpretative articulation of horizons of possibilities. By the
same token, there is no elementary referential semantics that articulates the
world “more primordially” than the interpretative-contextual articulation
within the world. Like the attitudes of contextual reading/representing in-
volved in a domain’s articulation, the NOA is an interpretative and practical
attitude. I will return to this point in the nal section.
Let me now resume the discussion of the hermeneutic perspective on
science. It is the interrelatedness of practices of inquiry that projects an open
horizon of possibilities (possible semanticmodels, data-models, and experi-
mental outcomes) for the research process.e point here is that the projec-
tion is not a mental (individual or collective) act, but something that is gen-
erated by the co-references and the mutual reinforcement of scientic prac-
tices, each of them distinguished by a particular space of representing and
reading objects of inquiry. (Tentatively speaking, the natural ontological at-
titude “works” within the deferring spaces of representation/reading. NOA
regulates the congurations of practices, being at the same time specied as
interpretative stance by these congurations.) What get projected are possi-
bilities of representing and reading scientic objects within integral spaces
of congured practices. e projected horizon is always already transcen-
dent with respect to what becomes actualized in each particular situation of
this process.e research process in a given domain has always a “potential-
ity for being”. Accordingly, the ongoing appropriation of these possibilities
remains constantly open. rough this appropriation a progressive artic-
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ulation of a domain (in the aforementioned three dimensions) comes into
being.e continuous actualization of possibilities and the concomitant ar-
ticulation of a domain of research objects are characterized by anticipations,
expectations and orientations assigned to the community which carries out
the research process. Like the routine practices of research, the possibilities
uponwhich the research process is projected do not have an autonomous re-
ality per se. Any suggestion of possibilities projected independently of their
appropriation within spaces of representation/reading would imply essen-
tialism of the same sort which authors like van Fraassen, Fine, and Rorty try
to overcome in order to combat the ination of metaphysics in the philoso-
phy of science.
Against the background of the foregoing considerations, let me intro-
duce now the concept of the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientic research.
is concept comes to the fore as a result of the eorts to specify the circular
nexus of understanding and interpretation with regard to the constitution
of scientic objects and the articulation of domains of research. Roughly
speaking, those who are involved in the research process of a given domain
understand the domain in the rst place as possibilities (of structural, con-
ceptual, and experimental articulation) that can be appropriated. One ap-
propriates the possibilities by employing readable technologies. In doing so,
one articulates the domain of research by actualizing possibilities of making
readable what is under investigation. Per denitionem, interpretation is ap-
propriation of possibilities by means of readable technologies, whereby the
actualized possibilities articulate the domain of research. A particular aspect
of this articulation is the constitution of new structures/objects of inquiry.
(I again intentionally refrain from taking a position here with regard to the
debate on whether structures have an ontological priority over objects, or
vice versa.) Understanding (the domain of research as a horizon of possi-
bilities) and interpretation (articulation through readable technologies) are
in constant interplay during the domain’s potentially innite articulation. It
is this interplay that I will call a hermeneutic fore-structure of a domain’s
(three-dimensional) articulation.
e hermeneutic fore-structure is projected in such a manner on the re-
search process that it enables the participants in that process (i) to “see in
advance” what gets articulated as objects integrated in spaces of represen-
tation; (ii) to “have in advance” domain’s thematic objects as “readable en-
tities”; and (iii) to “grasp in advance” the outcomes of independent tests as
“something ready-to-hand” by means of calibrated instruments and proce-
dures of measurement.e common component “in advance” refers to pos-
sibilities that can be appropriated in the structural, conceptual, and experi-
mental articulation. Following the established terminology of philosophical
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hermeneutics, these three aspects of the hermeneutic fore-structure are to
be respectively dubbed fore-sight, fore-having, and fore-conception. To re-
iterate, these aspects are to be clearly dierentiated by having recourse to the
ongoing appropriation of the projected horizon.e unity of them provides
the unity of domain’s three-dimensional articulation.13 It is the hermeneutic
fore-structuring of scientic research that keeps the interpretative openness
(as opposed to both essentialist determinism and teleological nalization) of
the domain.e hermeneutic fore-structure “works” against the attempts at
codifying a complete and ultimate cognitive structure of a scientic domain.
It constantly reveals possibilities for domain’s further articulation.
e hermeneutic fore-structure of domain’s articulation can be thema-
tized in several respects. One of them, which I am going now to exemplify,
is the way in which the projected horizon of research possibilities allows or
precludes the existence of certain theoretical objects. In 1961 Peter Mitchell
introduced in the domain of enzymology and bioenergetics a theoretical sce-
nario for the coupling of respiration and ATP synthesis. It is designed to
provide explanation of the energetic resources for the phosphorylation step
from ADT to ATP. On Mitchell’s account, the coupling of respiration and
ATP synthesis is mediated by an electrochemical gradient of protons across
the mitochondrial membrane. e emphasis was placed on the causal link
between the ow of electrons through the respiratory chain enzymes and the
translocation of protons across the innermitochondrial membrane.is ac-
count was deliberately forged as an alternative to the chemical mechanism
of the oxidative phophorylation which appeals not to anisotropic aws but
to enzyme-bound chemical compounds.14
In fact, Mitchell came to the scenario of “chemiosmotic coupling in en-
ergy transduction” (so the technical expression he proposed) in following
a particular scientic practice—the one of drawing analogies. In his case,
the analogy was between the osmotic translocation reactions (for instance,
the coupling of phosphate translocation against arsenate translocation) and
the enzyme catalysed group-transfer reactions.15ere was nothing unusual
in pursuing this thoroughly conventional scientic practice. Mitchell’s sce-
nario was by no means an exotic hypothesis since the chemiosmotic cou-
pling was known as early as the 1930s when a research group reported on
13 Since the hermeneutic fore-structure of scientic research is to be circumscribed neither in
the context of justication nor in the context of discovery, the studies into the interpretative
articulation of scientic domains has to be placed in a “context of constitution” (aer the
hermeneutic-phenomenological concept of constitution) that is completely independent
of the traditional context-distinction. (See Ginev 2006.)
14 On two nice philosophical reconstructions of Mitchell’s research program and its experi-
mental verications, see (Weber 2002) and (Prebble 2001).
15 See in this regard (Mitchell 1972).
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chemiosmotic coupling in group-transfer reactions in studying the role of
the NAD coenzyme. Nonetheless, until the mid 1960s the “chemiosmotic
mechanism” of energy generation implied by Mitchell’s scenario remained
without resonance in scientic community.ismechanismbrings into play
theoretical objects like “the transmembrane electrochemical potential pow-
ering the enzyme of the mitochondrial ATPase”, “the anisotropic enzymes
requiring two aqueous phases separated by a membrane”, “the phosphory-
lation reactions driven by proton-motive force”, and most of all “the elec-
trochemically based vectorial metabolism” (i.e. metabolism whose catalytic
systems are distinguished by a spatial orientation of the reactions’ dynam-
ics).ese are objects which the domain’s hermeneutic fore-structure at the
beginning of 1960s does not project as possible entities (i.e. entities whose
existence can be authenticated through domain’s articulation).
To put it dierently, at the beginning of 1960s the established congu-
ration of practices has not been projecting such research possibilities of do-
main’s articulation whose appropriation and actualization would have been
authenticated the existence of Mitchell’s theoretical objects. Within the in-
terrelated scientic practices the research community did not have the fore-
sight, fore-having, and fore-conception about these objects.ey were sim-
ply “impossible objects” within the established conguration of practices
entitled to unfold how mitochondria generate useful energy in the form of
adenosine triphosphate. Among the practices involved in that conguration
were practices of experimental identication of high-energy intermediates
that supposedly are capable of transferring a phosphate group in the for-
mation of ATP from ADP, practices of fractionation shedding light on the
energetic aspect of protein synthesis; amendments of themathematical plots
of enzyme kinetics, elaborations on formalism about the bioenergetic func-
tions of mitochondria, constructing of experimental systems for disclosing
new causal links in the biochemistry of respiration, and so on. All of these
practices were designed to provide evidence and conrmation of the chemi-
cal theory of ATP synthesis. Accordingly, the conguration of practices pro-
jected horizon of possibilities for identifying a purely chemical mechanism
of the oxidative phophorylation based entirely on high-energy intermediates
in the formation of ATP.ere was no room for theoretical objects related
to the ontological assumption that the mitochondrial bioenergy is due to an
electrochemical gradient of protons.
It was the change of the conguration of practices that made possible
the spaces of representation/reading of vectorial metabolism of respiration.
Based on the assumption that protons might be directly involved in the ox-
idative phosphorylation, several laboratories undertook experiments onpro-
ton gradients. In addition, more precise methodic of establishing the lo-
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cation of phosphorylating enzymes was introduced. Later on the practice
of measuring protons translocation in respiring mitochondria came on the
scene. As Marcel Weber (2002) makes it clear, thanks to this practice sev-
eral predictions made by Mitchell’s initial theory were conrmed. ough
many of the experimental results obtained explanations also in the frame-
work of the chemical theory, the conrmation through independent tests
provided a rationale for legitimizing (at least some) of the theoretical ob-
jects in whose existence the supporters of the chemiosmotic theory believed.
However, much more important was the new hermeneutic fore-structure
provoked by the (relatively small) change of the conguration of practices.
New possibilities for doing research became projected, including possibili-
ties whose appropriation was in line with the assumptions of the anisotropic
ows of energy and the vectorial metabolism.e theoretical objects envis-
aged by chemiosmotic theorywere signicantly specied and “inscribed” on
the horizon of new possibilities. Also a “conversion to the belief inMitchell’s
objects” took place. Whole laboratories launched research programs in-
spired by the belief in these objects. As a result, several research groups
started to articulate the domain of enzymological bioenergetics in accor-
dance with possibilities for instantiating the chemiosmotic mechanism via
data-models.
3. Approaching the Concept of Characteristic Hermeneutic Sit-
uation
Up to this point I spoke of research situations as congurations of scien-
tic practices distinguished by readable technologies. From the viewpoint
of philosophical hermeneutics, however, each collective cognitive process
takes place in a hermeneutic situation. Scientic research does not make
an exception. It always takes place in a characteristic hermeneutic situation,
i.e. in a situation in which the triad of fore-sight, fore-having, and fore-
conception becomes specied in a certain manner.16 is specication is
to be tentatively explicated as a (relatively stable) tendency in the domain’s
articulation.
e hermeneutic fore-structure is not something that is statically pre-
given to the dynamics of scientic research. In each conguration of sci-
entic practices the unity of fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception
opens itself in a specic manner. e hermeneutic fore-structure (as pos-
sibilities of seeing, having, and grasping domain’s empirical and theoretical
16us, one has to discriminate between the particular situations of a research process and
the hermeneutic situation which characterizes the ongoing interpretative articulation in-
voked by that process.
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articulation) does not have a being-in-itself thatmight be separated from the
changing congurations of scientic practices. Nevertheless, there is a gen-
eral characteristic of how a domain’s cognitive structuring gets constantly
embedded in an open (and changeable) hermeneutic fore-structure. is
general characteristic expresses itself as a tendency in the reading process
that brings into being scientic objects distinguished by way of their contex-
tual representation and the degree to which they can be de-contextualized
by practices of idealization.e balance between contextualization and de-
contextualization which persists in the articulation of a domain of scientic
research I call a characteristic hermeneutic situation. From the very outset
the scientic domain becomes disclosed (for a further articulation) in such
a situation. Intuitively speaking, the research process as a process of reading
is characterized by conjugated dimensions of (re)contextualization and de-
contextualization of what gets constituted as objects of inquiry.e second
dimension strongly hinges on the formal codication (by means of mathe-
matical idealizations) of the objects.ey exist as codied entities inmathe-
matical space-time. All readable technologies employed in the research pro-
cess are to be isolated from the outcome of this process. As a consequence,
the objects of inquiry are completely de-contextualized—an extreme case
that can be only approximated via strong practices of idealization.
e balance between de- and re-contextualization of scientic objects
depends rst and foremost on the separability degree of the readable tech-
nologies being implemented from what gets read.e more these technolo-
gies are isolable from the reading process, the stronger is the tendency to
de-contextualization. e opposite case is when the readable technologies
become “integral element” of the objects of inquiry. In this case, if dierent
readable technologies provide alternative spaces of representation, one can-
not avoid the use of a version of uncertainty principle in order to get a coher-
ent theoretical constitution of the objects. Yet the balance between de- and
re-contextualization needs a stable point of reference. In my view, it is the
natural ontological attitude that serves the function of such a point. It tacitly
sets limits of reasonable de- or re-contextualization in reading/representing
objects of inquiry.
In reaching this conclusion, I touch on the issue of the formation of
local epistemological positions. Leaning on this reasonability, one denes
norms and criteria for assessing domain’s articulation, thereby paving the
way to the formation of an epistemological position. Reasonability and prac-
tical rationality are intrinsic properties of the natural ontological attitude. In
scientic research they make possible the resilience in implementing read-
able technologies and arranging appropriate spaces of representation. Rea-
sonability and practical rationality manifest the fore-having, fore-sight, and
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fore-conception of reading/representing in a given research situation. e
anticipations and expectations related to the interpretative fore-structuring
license a kind of proto-normativity that accompanies reasonability and prac-
tical rationality. Within the tendency launched by a characteristic hermeneu-
tic situation the proto-normativity gets stabilized and transformed into ex-
plicit epistemological normativity. On this scenario, the reasonability of the
natural ontological attitude does not vanish with the formation of local epis-
temological positions. It becomes rather specied with regard to the balance
between de- and (re)contextualization.
Now the reversible assertion is also valid: e tendency of specifying
a local epistemological position within the interpretative fore-structuring
of domain’s articulation is the characteristic hermeneutic situation of that
articulation. is tendency persists in the changing congurations of sci-
entic practices.e local epistemological position is in a constant process
of formation since it is constantly fore-structured by the interpretative ap-
propriation of projected possibilities. In this process of formation of the
characteristic hermeneutic situation takes shape as threefold balance be-
tween (a) the proto-normativity of interpretative fore-structuring and the
explicit epistemological norms and criteria; (b) the contextualization and
de-contextualization of scientic objects; and (c) the interpretative openness
and model-semantic determination of domain’s conceptual-formal struc-
tures.
Let me recapitulate the considerations of this section. In scientic re-
search the circulative nexus of understanding and interpretation takes the
form of a hermeneutic fore-structure of a domain’s structural, conceptual,
and experimental articulation. In each particular research situation (con-
guration of scientic practices as readable technologies) the research pro-
cess is characterized by fore-sight, fore-having, and fore-conception of what
becomes articulated as an outcome of appropriated possibilities. It is this
hermeneutic context in which I would like to place now the concept of the
natural ontological attitude. More specically, I am going to claim in the
next section that NOA is the interpretative attitude toward what gets dis-
closed by domain’s horizon of possibilities. When Fine reaches the conclu-
sion that neither the realist nor the anti-realist can stand outside the world,
and that they cannot survey some area o the playing eld and mark it out
as what the game is about, he actually arms the priority of the state of
being-in-the-world over the disentangled epistemic position that represents
the “external world”. e natural ontological attitude is the interpretative
stance of orienting practically within the world. In other words, the natu-
ral ontological attitude is the base for all kinds of “practical interpretation”
that is taken for granted by common sense epistemology and the philosoph-
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ically elaborated epistemologies. Interpretative stance in practical orienta-
tionwithin the world amounts to choosing and appropriating possibilities of
how to comport contextually. In this regard, the natural ontological attitude
as interpretative stance “nds” the world in the rst place as a horizon of
possibilities. Homely true is the practically oriented interpretative delibera-
tion within the world that articulates the world in a pre-epistemological way.
is interpretative deliberation does not get lost or eliminated in scientic
research. It is rather fore-structuring the results of this research. Scientists
are working in their domains of research by being committed to the pre-
scientic (natural) interpretative stance.
4. Rereading NOA
According to Fine, the death of realismwas hastened by the victory of Bohr’s
non-realist philosophy of quantum theory over Einstein’s philosophical re-
alism.e further development of the controversy about the interpretation
of quantum mechanics called into question—so Fine’s argument goes—the
very debate between realism and anti-realism.e extra-theoretical relation
of “being approximately true” which the realist immerses between scientic
theories and the world is neither to be proved nor to be refuted. It simply
must be rejected as a kind of metaphysically hypostatized essentialism.e
anti-realist advocacy of essentialism consists in postulating global intrinsic
features of science’s cognitive organization. Empirical adequacy and useful-
ness are examples of such features.ough the anti-realist does not immerse
an extra-theoretical relation between theories and the world, she still (due
to the postulation of intrinsic features) commits to an external position to
scientic enterprise. In repudiating the realist’s ination of metaphysics, the
anti-realist undertakes an ination of epistemology and/or semantics.
Fine cogently reveals the close connection between philosophical ex-
ternalism and metaphysical/cognitive essentialism.17 In his later work—
roughly, the papers from the last two decades—he is not so much preoccu-
pied withNOA conception. Yet the issue of avoiding philosophical external-
ism/globalism continues to be a leading theme for him.18 To be sure, his phi-
17 See in this regard Rouse’s (1996, 90–100) interpretation of Fine’s conception.
18 For a nice illustration of this development see (Fine 2009). In this paper one is to read
the following statement: “In the context of the realism debates a demand to explain the
success of science is familiar. By now one would have thought it also suspicious, since the
endless run-around pursued in those debates makes it clear that, in this context, attending
to the demand for explanation leads nowhere philosophically useful. In view of that it is
hard to see why a global demand for philosophical explanations, a demand with respect to
all scientic practice, should even be a player in coming to terms with our philosophical
work. Talk of goals here seems a thinly disguised way of imposing a philosophical agenda
without providing any plausible rationalization for why it would be reasonable or fruitful
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losophizing “from the inside of science” echoes important moments of Car-
nap’s discussion of the “internal questions”. ese are the questions which
can be only formulated within science’s linguistic frameworks, thereby be-
coming distinguished from the metaphysical “external questions”. Likewise
Fine is convinced that the external philosophical debate over realism does
not concern questions that can be settled by developments of the sciences,
no matter how successful science may be.
Notoriously, Fine refers to NOA also as a “core position” that counsels
us to accept the results of science “on a par with more homely truths” with-
out appealing to more esoteric epistemological considerations and justica-
tions.us, the core position is both independent of all positions within the
realism-debate, and a common prerequisite of these positions. A realist or
an anti-realist position becomes emancipated when one adds on to the core
position ontological doctrines and epistemological analyses. By contrast, the
core position mediates between the poles of realism and anti-realism with-
out incorporating metaphysical additives. On this account, anti-realists add
on to the core position pragmatic, conventionalist, or instrumentalist con-
ceptions of truth as well as several methodological strictures. What realists
add on in the rst place is a strategy for avoiding the elimination of the con-
ception of truth as correspondence with the world, (sometimes) arguments
for a separation of realism from any semantic doctrine (including referen-
tial semantics), and (again in some cases) meta-narratives of how science’s
historical progress approximates the fundamental truths about the external
world.
By advocating (metaphysical or cognitive) essentialism, one works out
the doctrines of realism and anti-realism as “unnatural attitudes”. Fine’s con-
ception is most of all a “minimalist” (i.e. a radically anti-essentialist) philos-
ophy of science that operates on the model of immanent literary criticism.
Fine (1984, 41) goes on to draw the attention to another parallel: In the same
manner in which minimalist art serves the function of an immanent crit-
icism of art, the conception of NOA operates as local criticism within sci-
ence’s own leeway.e minimalist philosophical intervention in this leeway
should be instrumental in settling long-standing methodological debates in
science—a possibility typically illustrated by Fine’s excellent studies in the
history of quantum mechanics. According to him (1996, 254), what one
needs is a non-realist immanent criticism for post-realist times. e mini-
malist philosophy of science sketches out supposedly the premises of such
a criticism. To have a natural attitude toward the world amounts to inter-
preting the world in a “natural manner”, i.e. in a manner that is presumably
“homely true” for all agents dealing instrumentally with what is ready to
to pursue” (Fine 2009, 212).
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hand within the world.
ough Fine does not lay an explicit claim, he tacitly admits the cultural
universality of the core position. is tacit admission hinges on the (pre-
sumably anthropologically) universal credence in primary (homely) truths
that are not in need of epistemological justications. More specically, hu-
man beings are always getting knowledge against the background of “always
already accepted” primary truths.ey do not call into question these truths
when they (in admitting additional ontological assumptions) are elaborating
on more sophisticated epistemic constructions designed to disclose “non-
familiar truths”.is means that they have an understanding of the world as
being articulated in accordance with these truths. By changing fundamen-
tally the understanding of the world, science appeals to much more articu-
lated images of reality corresponding to science’s objective truths. However
strong the divergence between the articulation (against the background of
primary truths) and science’s images of reality might become, the construc-
tion of knowledge in scientic research keeps necessarily presupposing this
background. In this regard, the latter informs the acceptance of science’s
results on a par with always already accepted truths, which is Fine’s basic
point. e aforementioned universality of the core position (i.e. the posi-
tion which takes for granted the background of primary truths) concerns
in the rst place the nexus of understanding and interpretative articulation
(as this was discussed in the previous section). It is this nexus that crosses
the borderline between pre-scientic (practical) experience and the scien-
tic research.
In the early 1980s Fine developed the conception of the natural ontologi-
cal attitude (to a certain extent) as a radicalization of Rorty’s undoing episte-
mological representationalism and foundationalism. (is radicalization is
also intimately related to Fine’s minimalist image of philosophy of science.)
e natural ontological attitude is not a contemplative attitude.e very ex-
pression does not designate a static relationship between the knowing sub-
ject (as a passive observer) and the “external world” out there. A constitutive
moment of the “nature” of human existence is the practical attitude toward
the world. By implication, the natural ontological attitude characterizes the
human agents’ practical involvement in the world. e natural ontological
attitude is an active stance that is not isolable from the stream of changing
congurations of practices that provide the access to the world. It is a stance
of practitioners who “face” the world through their practices.19 is is why
19 On this account, the world is articulated interpretatively by practitioners within ongo-
ing contextual transformations of the horizon of possibilities. Being-in-the-world is the
expression used in philosophical hermeneutics for this state of aairs. e contact with
entities is always mediated by practices, whereby the primary status ascribed to the enti-
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Fine goes on to argue that his conception is closely allied to Rorty’s episte-
mological behaviorism.20
Now, let me try to derive some more consequences from assigning to
NOA the status of an interpretative attitude that precedes the formation
of (local and contextual) epistemological positions in scientic research. It
should be emphasized in a tentative manner that the expression “NOA pre-
cedes the formation” in this formulation is neither to be related to a causal
determinism, nor to be understood in a literary temporal sense.e expres-
sion has rather much to do with a projection of interpretative fore-structure
that contextualizes a formative process. It is this thesis that promotes the
search for a convergence between the conception ofNOAand the hermeneu-
tic theory of scientic research as sketched out in the preceding section.
To reiterate, NOA is the interpretative-practical attitude toward the
world. It is “natural” because this attitude takes place always already within
the world of familiar and routine practices. Accordingly, the world is con-
stantly interpreted by human beings as practitioners (in particular, as practi-
tioners doing “normal” (in Kuhnian sense) scientic research). In stressing
this aspect, one has good reasons to oppose AlanMusgrave’s celebrated real-
ist construal of NOA. Since the referential way of treating truth is built into
the core position (and the semantic conception of truth is a version of the
common-sense correspondence theory of truth)—so this construal goes—
NOA is the starting-point for defending realism in the philosophy of science.
e epistemologicalminimalism committed to a common-sense correspon-
dence theory of truth is a kind of minimal realism. In Musgrave’s account,
there is no one core position for realists and anti-realists to accept. Indeed,
there is no such position if one assumes that it consists of elementary epis-
temological statements that express an embryo form of realism. But one is
not obliged to accept such an assumption. In treating NOA as contextually
specied interpretative stance toward the world, one is not to admit that it
is determined by elementary epistemological statements. Moreover, if such
a kind of determinism takes place, it would imply a version of essentialism
that Fine repudiates. By contrast, the construal of NOA as interpretative-
practical attitude lays emphasis upon its capability to contextualize in a pre-
ties within the world is not the status of independent objects, but the status of something
ready-to-hand for practitioners. In the hermeneutic rereading of NOA I am suggesting,
the pragmatic character of this attitude should be made to refer to the deliberative com-
portment in dealing with what is ready-to-hand. NOA is a “natural” (i.e. based on natural
ontological assumptions) pragmatic interpretation of the world that takes place within the
world. By being committed to this attitude, practitioners appropriate possibilities to deal-
ing with entities in the changing contexts of being-in-the-world. Accordingly, one faces
the world as a pragmatic potentiality for being.
20 Rorty (2007) in his turn announced Fine for his favored philosopher of science.
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epistemological manner the formation of epistemological positions liable to
assess decisions made in the respective contexts.
To sum up, in treating NOA in terms of a primitive epistemological po-
sition (i.e. as an epistemological position without philosophical additives),
one fails to meet the critical arguments against the core position’s indepen-
dence. Yet there is also another option on oer—to assign to NOA a pre-
epistemological status, thereby admitting that the characteristics of the in-
terpretative attitude toward the world (as this attitude is established within
the world) are at the same time premises for having local epistemological
positions in scientic research. Because the natural ontological attitude is
not a kind of proto-realist position, it is not correct to hold that realists can
accept “the more homely true vision” of the world invoked by this attitude,
but the anti-realists cannot. In fact, both of them accept it tacitly, specifying
it (if they are working scientists and not philosophers) contextually. I think
that this option is congruent with Fine’s intentions, although he has never
used the term ‘pre-epistemological’.21
In assigning a pre-epistemological status to NOA, one meets also an-
other critical argument raised against Fine’s conception—the argument of
circularity. According to it, the supporter of this conception appeals to the
same sort of judgment (and by implication, commits the same fallacy) which
Fine ascribes to the realist, “who presupposes the truth-conferring ability
of arguments to the best explanation in a meta-theoretical argument for
the truth-conferring power of arguments to the best explanation in science”
(Rouse 1988, 296).e defense of the view that the concept of truth is con-
textually situated requires a contextualist theory of justication.ough un-
derstood as a local position, the same kind of (realist) epistemological justi-
cationworks again (in the defense ofNOA) at the level of scientic research
and at a meta-theoretical level. us, a (presumably) vicious circularity of
epistemological justication—so the critical argument goes—is unavoidable
in Fine’s conception. is circularity does not come to the fore, however, if
NOA is distinguished by a pre-epistemological status. Several considera-
tions that support the ascription of such a status to NOA are to be found in
Fine’s work.
21 In my view, the natural ontological attitude is not a common-sense epistemology as well.
Like professional philosophy’s “esoteric epistemologies”, the common-sense epistemology
presumes an interpretative articulation of the world.rough this articulation the agents
within the world are anticipating the truthfulness of the content of statements about par-
ticular individuals, properties, relations, processes, and so forth in whose existence the
agents (guided post festum by common-sense epistemology) believe. In being anticipated
in such a manner, the common-sense epistemology is capable to sanction ordinary ref-
erential semantics, and commit the practitioners within the world to the existence of the
individuals, entities and events referred by the experiential statements.
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When Fine repudiates the “realist metaphysical picture of the world”,
he pinpoints three interpretative characteristics of the attitude toward the
world. He discusses them with regard to the way in which they mediate the
“access” to the world.22e rst characteristic is the contextual relevance and
validity of an epistemological position. On Fine’s account, the commitment
to amonolithic epistemological stance should be rejected since scientists fol-
low dierent networks of aims, norms, standards and criteria in the dierent
contexts of their research work. Science is not an epistemologically unied
enterprise, determined by a global normative position. Accordingly, scien-
tists’ attitude toward the world is predicated on an interpretative resilience
that requires a local, nuanced, and contextual approach to the constitution
of a meaningful access to the world through scientic practices.23 Stress-
ing that due to the contextual-interpretative access to the world the episte-
mological positions of scientists are predicated on conditional relevance is
Fine’s strongest argument against metaphysical globalism proered by both
the realist and the anti-realist.
e second interpretative characteristic of the attitude toward the world
is the interactive reciprocity in dealing with the entities in the world. e
entities which we causally interact with—so Fine’s argument goes—are not
independent of us. In interacting with entities, we are always embedded
in contexts of interaction, whereby the entities become entangled with our
practices. One has to add to this formulation that our practices make the
world a meaningful totality of practical entities, projected upon the horizon
of their possible uses.
e third interpretative characteristic is the “contamination” of the in-
formation about the objects within the world. It involves unavoidably in-
formation about the interacted-with things. In other words, the scientic
information about the objects of inquiry “out there” is always contaminated
with information about the contextual-practical interaction with these ob-
jects. Since the objects of inquiry are contextualized by congured scientic
practices, the “contamination”with contextual contingencies is not to be dis-
pelled from the research process as well.
Despite the discussion of the three interpretative characteristics, Fine’s
concept of the “access to the world” remains insuciently scrutinized. Inmy
view, the conception of NOA is to be further developed by having recourse
to the interpretative premises of contextual resilience, interactive reciprocity,
and cognitive “contamination” which are underlying (not the global episte-
mological positions involved in the realism-debate, but) the local positions
stemming out contextually of scientists’ research work. An important clue
22 See, in particular, (Fine 1986).
23 See in this regard (Fine 1991).
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about the further development is to be found inMusgrave’s report on a con-
versation he has had with Fine in 1987. It has been suggested to Musgrave
by that conversation the following point: Since the natural ontological at-
titude is not committed to actual (non-scientic or scientic) entities, one
should attribute to the NOA a “complete philosophical know-nothing-ism”
(Musgrave 1989, 53). But just because NOA is not ontologically committed
to actual presence in theworld out there, it commits to all possibilities whose
actualizations might take place. One might manage to let science speaks for
itself, if and only if one does not burden science with a commitment to the
existence of entities as a pure (actual) presence. Guided by the NOA, sci-
entic research is constantly projected upon possibilities that never become
subordinated to an ultimate (cognitive, metaphysical, or whatever) aim.
e view that the access to the world is to be only achieved within a
projected horizon of possibilities is implied by the primacy of the charac-
teristics of interpretative resilience, interactive reciprocity, and “contamina-
tion”.24 us, the concept of the “access to the world” is one that tracs
in certain ontological assumptions that assign to the potentiality-for-being
a priority over the being-as-a-pure-presence. is construal sheds light, in
my view, on the ontological commitment of NOA. Contrary to Rorty (2007,
144), I think that the notion of ontological commitment is not a notion that
the conception of NOA could get along without. NOA is committed to the
world as it is revealed by the primary homely truths. But (in line with Fine’s
intentions) the notion of ontological commitment should be illuminated not
by means of a realist metaphysics. It is a notion that has to be circumscribed
by a hermeneutic doctrine of the potentiality-for-being.
is further development (and reformulation in the hermeneutic con-
text sketched out in the preceding section) of the NOA conception sharpens
its arguments against the teleological picture’s of science depicted by the ex-
ternal philosophies whose metaphysical ination consists in the rst place
in imposing an ultimate aim of science. Philosophy of science ought to dis-
pense with teleological frameworks in which to set the research process. In
line againwith Fine’s elaborations, one is to state that scientic research in its
diversity of contexts and situations shows its multiple- and mini-aims daily.
In placing the conception of NOA in a hermeneutic context (that avoids any
superimposition of a priori explanation) one becomes provided with a ratio-
nale for restraining from searching for authorities that allegedly authenticate
24 I am speaking here of ‘primacy’ in the sense that they are not “derivable” from a primary
referential stance toward the world. At this point, my reformulation of NOA runs in con-
trast to Fine’s original view. Fine insists on the inscrutability of such a stance. It is unclear
how he reconciles this insistence with his treatment of interpretative resilience, interactive
reciprocity, and “contamination” as constituting the access to the world.
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science. Scientic research has neither external nor internal authorities, but
it is constantly interpretatively fore-structured. For NOA crosses the bor-
der between pre-scientic “interpretative deliberation” and science’s inter-
pretative articulation, it might be taken into consideration in two dierent
respects.
On the one hand, NOA is a primary interpretative attitude within the
world on which all kinds of scientic research are grounded.25 e mini-
malist core position which involves “natural” ontological assumptions (cor-
responding to the more homely truths) should be open to the integration
of new assumptions when one articulates a domain of research.e natural
ontological attitude does not remain unaected when operating in domain’s
articulation. Otherwise the NOA would have prevented one from disclos-
ing possibilities whose appropriation contradicts the core position’s assump-
tions. In this regard, one can concede that the NOA undergoes various ex-
tensions and enrichments in the reading process of scientic research.ese
are in the rst place extensions of the belief in what exists. For the commu-
nity articulating a domain of research the new entities are no less “natural”
than the entities (individuals, processes, events, and so on) one has in the
pre-scientic natural ontological attitude. is statement does not diverge
from Fine’s claim that the “working scientists” do not add on to the core
position realist or anti-realist doctrines. e extensions and enrichments I
am speaking about have to do only with the domain’s articulation.ey are
neutral with regard to the realism debate. Furthermore, any enrichment of
NOA with new ontological assumptions is an intrinsic event of a domain’s
three-dimensional articulation. It does not demand a superimposition of
an external position on the natural interpretation of the world taking place
in human agents’ everyday practices. ere is no rupture in the transitions
from these practices to specialized practices of science’s research work.e
intrinsic continuity does not require an external philosophical explanation.
On the other hand, NOA is an interpretative attitude within scientic
research that plays a crucial role in the specication of a hermeneutic fore-
structure as a characteristic hermeneutic situation. e NOA mediates the
transformation from the proto-normativity of interpretative fore-structuring
to the explicit epistemological norms, rules and criteria. In the way of ap-
propriating possibilities of doing research scientists make explicit the proto-
normative fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception as contextual norms
25is would be a quasi-Husserlian scenario of philosophical investigation of science. As
already indicated, Fine rejects a reinterpretation of his conception inHusserlian terms. Yet
the possibility of such an investigation can be designed in amore hermeneutic way that has
little to do withHusserl’s critique of science through unfolding in a transcendental manner
the world of the natürliche Einstellung.
Dimitri Ginev 41
and criteria. More specically, the NOA as entangled with a hermeneu-
tic fore-structure of appropriating possibilities for doing research “assists”
(due to its reasonability) the transformation of the proto-normative fore-
having, fore-sight, and fore-conception into local norms and rules of de-
and re-contextualization of scientic objects. is transformation is a nec-
essary moment for endowing the tendency of specifying the hermeneutic
fore-structuring as a characteristic hermeneutic situation with a normative
force. Yet NOA does not remain indierent to the result of the specication.
Placed in a characteristic situation, it becomes a normative attitude too. Be-
ing in such a situation NOA’s reasonability vindicates or discards a scientic
community’s views and visions of truth, objectivity, completeness, concep-
tual simplicity, etc. when this community makes particular epistemic deci-
sions. us, in a characteristic hermeneutic situation NOA opens the way
(by regulating the transformation of proto-notmativity into explicit norms
and rules) to local epistemological positions.
It is the hermeneutic rereading of NOA that opens the avenue to a dia-
logue between the methodologically shaped hermeneutics and the kinds of
non-representationalist and non-foundational epistemology. No doubt, it is
a dialogue that promises new perspectives in the philosophy of science and
science studies. Yet more important than these perspectives is the chance
for a genuine exchange between the traditions of analytical and Continen-
tal philosophy in the post-science-wars era. It is this exchange that should
weaken the traditional dichotomies (trying eventually to get rid of them)
and bridge the gaps brought into existence by the mutual misunderstand-
ing. Paraphrasing Fine, what one needs is a philosophical identity of science
for a post-war time.
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